ing behind that case seems to have been that a single dispensation with a condition destroyed the condition altogether. This would have been at least a plausible application of the rule against the apportionment of conditions. The trouble is that this reasoning did not fit the facts of Dumpor's Case or the situation to which the rule of Dumpor's Case has been most conspicuously applied. In that case the condition was not to alien without license and a license was given, so that there was full compliance with the condition and no dispensation. There was no severance either of the reversion or of the leasehold. There was no joint lease and license given to some but not all of the joint lessees. There was a condition, not absolute, but subject to an exception, and Dumpor's Case seems to have gone the full way of holding that the exception operated as a dispensation, 1 1 whereas the proper effect of the exception would seem to have been to have cut down the condition so as to have made it inapplicable within the scope of the exception. We may suspect that the real explanation of the decision in Dumpor's Case lies in the feeling against restraints on alienation. 1 2 Certainly it had no proper foundation in the law of conditions. 1 3 If, as it would seem, the reasoning behind Dumpor's Case was that a single dispensation with a condition destroyed the condition altogether, this would have seemed just as applicable to a dispensation by subsequent waiver as to a dispensation by previous license.1" It is not surprising, therefore, that English reform legislation has been made broad enough to cover both situations. Lord St. Leonard's Act, 1859,11 provided that a license to do an act causing forfeiture should extend only to the act specified,1 6 that licenses to one of several lessees, or applying to part only of the property, should not affect other lessees or parts 17 and that conditions for the payment of rent might be apportioned on the severance of the reversion. 2 8 In the following year, it was enacted that a waiver by a lessor in a particular feiture was restricted to cases of rent by Lord Eldon unless there were fraud, accident, mistake or surprise.3° In 1860 relief from forfeiture for rent was made possible in courts of law." The common law requirements for the enforcement of forfeiture for rent were very strict. Unless it was stipulated to the contrary, demand for the exact amount of the rent had to be made upon the premises on the day it was due, a convenient time before, and at sunset.
3 2 A statute of George II," however, allowed a forfeiture without such demand under certain conditions when the rent had been due for six months. The recent legislation in England did not affect the law of forfeitures as to rent, 34 except that relief to a sub-lessee is expressly mentioned. 35 As to conditions other than the payment of rent, the law was vitally changed by the Conveyancing Act, 1881.30 Relief against forfeiture for failure to insure had been granted in equity in 1859 37 and at law in 1860. 38 The act of 1881, however, made relief the general rule and made notice a general prerequisite to enforcement. Conditions against the assigning, underletting, parting with the possession, or disposing of the land leased were made an exception to the general rule as to relief and notice by the act of 1881,31 but these exceptions have been removed by the Law of Property Act, 1925.40 Conditions for forfeiture on the bankruptcy of the lessee or on the taking in execution of the lessee's interest were also excepted from the general rule as to relief and notice in the act of 1881,41 but by the Conveyancing, Act, 1892,-this exception was confined to leases of agricultural or pastoral land, mines or minerals, a public-house or beer-shop, a furnished house, or any property where the personal qualifications of the tenant are of importance for the pre-servation of the property or because of neighborhood to the lessor or his tenants, save that in the case of leases other than these the general rule as to relief and notice was not to be applicable after one year from the date of bankruptcy or execution unless the lessee's interest were sold within that time. These provisions as to conditions against bankruptcy and the taking in execution of the lessee's interest are re-enacted in the Law of Property Act, 1925 . 43 A further exception to the general rule as to relief and notice in the Conveyancing Act, 1881," and this is retained in the Law of Property Act, 1925,45 is made in the case of a mining lease as to conditions for allowing the lessor to have access to or inspect books, accounts, records, weighing machines or other things, or to enter or inspect the mine or the workings thereof. It is clear that notice and relief are very much the general rule and the old freedom in enforcing conditions very much the exception. Forfeiture for disclaimer of the landlord's title, 4 6 however, and other forfeitures based on implied conditions are, it would seem from the language of the statute, left untouched.
The general rule as to the enforcement of express conditions is, therefore, that they shall not be enforceable by action or entry unless and until the lessor serves on the lessee a notice (a) specifying the particular breach complained of; (b), if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy the breach; and (c), in any case, requiring the lessee to make compensation for the breach, and then the lessee fails within a reasonable time thereafter to remedy the breach, if it is capable of remedy, and to make reasonable compensation in money to the satisfaction of the lessor for the breach. 47 On receipt of notice the lessee may apply to the court for relief or may wait for the lessor to bring action and then apply,"1 but he must not wait until the lessor has recovered possession in an action. 49 The court has the widest powers in granting relief and the House of Lords held it inadvisable to lay down any rigid rules for guiding the discretion of the court. may also give relief to an under-lessee, but the latter cannot obtain a term longer than that remaining of the original sublease.1 A new provision in the recent property acts" makes special provision for relief where the condition relates to internal decorative repairs. The court is to satisfy itself whether the notice is unreasonable, taking into particular consideration the length of the lessee's unexpired term. The section was aimed at certain forms of extortion reported to be current."
The law as to enforcement of and relief from forfeitures in the United States is about where it was in England in the time of Lord Eldon.5 4 Such progress as there has been has occurred in the development of statutory summary proceedings especially for the non-payment of rent. Here a notice to quit after a certain number of days is a common prerequisite to bringing proceedings 5 and payment or tender of the rent within that period a bar. G Quite commonly the tenant may pay rent and costs before the judgment is rendered or before the issuance or execution of the writ, and in a few states "redemption" is allowed even after dispossession under the judgment.' Ordinarily, summary proceedings do not lie for the enforcement of express conditions in a lease,z" but in some states they are allowed for the failure to perform some other stipulation than for the payment of rent." But this has not gone very far.
CONVERSION OF LONG TERMS INTO FEES
Since the Conveyancing Acts of 188110 and 1882 61 it has been possible, under certain conditions, for the holder of a term which, as originally created, was for not less than three hundred years and of which a residue of not less than two hundred years remains unexpired to enlarge his term into a fee simple by a deed to that effect. The conditions, however, very much restrict the operation of this privilege. (1)
There must be no trust or right of redemption in favor of the reversioner. (2) There must be no rent having a money value reserved or, if such rent has been reserved, it must have been released, barred by lapse ENGLISH PROPERTY REFORM of time or in some other way ceased to be payable. (3) It must not be liable to be determined by re-entry for condition broken. Under the Law of Property Act, 1925, G 2 if the rent does not exceed the yearly sum of one pound and has not been paid for a continuous period of twenty years, it shall be deemed to have ceased to be payable provided at least five years have elapsed since the taking effect of the act.
The principal application of these provisions would seem to be to "long terms" given by way of mortgage or for the raising of portions, although, no doubt, they are also applicable to the long terms taken by purchasers in the time of Elizabeth to avoid feudal incidents, many of which Mr. Joshua Williams said in 1876 were still in existence. 6 3 They can have little application to commercial leases, for, in the first place, few such leases, and then only building leases, are made for a longer term than ninety-nine years, 64 and the invariable custom is for the commercial lease to provide for entry on condition broken, which alone prevents the application of the section. 3 When the right of redemption is barred or any trust in favor of the reversioner gone, it is only fitting that the termor with a no-rent, indefeasible, two hundred year term left should have the fee. This is in accord with the reasons back of statutes of limitation and adverse possession and the rule against perpetuities.
This legislation is a complement to that with regard to the automatic cessation of "satisfied terms." G" In both cases "long terms" by way of mortgage or for raising portions are principally involved, but in the former case these have not been satisfied, while in the latter case they have. The extensive use of satisfied terms in trnst to attend the izheritavice ,7 marked the heighth of artificiality in the old conveyancing.,! The Satisfied Terms Act, 1845,69 provided for the automatic cessation of such terms and the Law of Property Act, 1925, is even more extensive in its operation.
These long terms, either by way of mortgage, or for the purpose of raising portions, are unfamiliar in the United States, so that legislation of the kind in question could have little, if any, application. The long building lease for ninety-nine years, however, seems to be coming into favor. 71 
ABOLITION OF TERMS DETERMINABLE ON LIVES
As estates for life are no longer permitted as legal estates in England,72 it would have been anomalous to have allowed the familiar term for years determinable on lives or marriage as a legal interest, and it has accordingly been abolished 71 and converted into a term terminable by a one month's notice in writing after the death or marriage, as the case may be. 4 It is not anticipated that this substitute will be extensively used. It is this exclusion of a term for years determinable with life or lives or with the cesser of a determinable life interest that distinguishes the "term of years absolute," which is of such frequent use in The Law of Property Act, 1925, from the ordinary term of years. 76 A "term of years absolute" includes a term "with or without impeachment for waste, subject or not to another legal estate, and either certain or liable to determination by notice, re-entry, operation of law or by a provision for cesser on redemption. 7 it is provided that perpetually renewable leaseholds shall henceforth take effect as terms for two thousand years subject to a power in the lessee of terminating them on ten days notice at any date upon which they would have terminated but for renewal. 7 0 Perpetually renewable leases have never been favored 80 and the opinion of certain conveyancers that they were inconvenient from the conveyancing point of view and costly because of the renewals and incidental costs resulted in their downfal"s1 Fines for renewal on leases existing at the commencement of the act are converted into rent,-but in the case of leases created afterwards, the conversion into long terms takes place without any obligation for payment of any fines, fees, costs, or other money in respect of renewal,63 so that it is confidently expected that no such leases will be created in the future. 1 4 The feeling against renewals r resulted in the further provision that any contract, whether in a lease or not, entered into for the renewal of a lease for a term exceeding sixty years from the termination of the lease should be void.6 Perpetually renewable leases have been even less favored in the United States than in England 17 and, it is believed, are of even less frequent occurrence.
THE REJUVENESCENCE OF THE FEE TAIL
If one be tempted to assume the role of prophet as to the future course of the law, the history of the fee tail may well cause him to pause. The power to dock the entail Il would have seemed to have been its undoing, for why should anyone create a fee tail which the tenant in tail in possession could immediately destroy? Already at the date of Taltarum's Case,8 in 
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1472, the practice of suffering recoveries for the purpose of docking entails seems to have been in full working order, and in the course of the next hundred years the common recovery became a "common assurance" for that purpose. 00 It became a commonplace of the courts that the right to dock an entail was a right inherent in the estate which no ingenuity of the conveyancer could circumvent.1-'The feeling against the unbarrable entail took shape in the term "perpetuity" and the courts set their faces against it. 92 As a matter of fact, the possibility of docking the entail does seem in the end to have destroyed the usefulness of the fee tail in possession, although the latter continued to characterize family settlements even during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, 3 and probably did not become obsolete until about the time of the Commonwealth. 4 About that time the method of preserving contingent remainders from destruction by means of life estates to preserve contingent remainders was devised 05 and the modern strict settlement created. 0 Instead of a gift to a man and his wife and the heirs of their bodies, 9T the husband, and, sometimes, the wife, were now given a life estate with remainders in fee tail made to their unborn sons in succession. 98 As the concurrence of the life tenant was necessary to the destruction of the fee tail, neither the life tenant nor the tenant in fee tail in remainder could make any effective disposition of the property without the concurrence of the other. 9 As a result, England has had the system of settlement and re-settlement when the eldest son is of age. 1 0 0 The tenancy in tail in remainder thus had a vigorous career after the tenancy in tail in possession had run its course. In fact, in one form or other, the tenancy in tail has been the corner stone of the English system of settled land. As a system of holding land it failed. 10 ' The life tenant in possession took the place of the tenant in tail. But as a conveyancing device, the tenancy in tail continued to have many advantages.
warranty appeared very soon after De Donis was passed. See Updegraff, op. cit. supra note 88, at 217 et seq.
Except as a conveyancing device, however, there was little to be said for the fee tail. It was, of course, objectionable to those who were opposed to settled land and the dominance of the land-owning classes.1 0 2 It was also objectionable to lawyers who were in favor of thorough-going reform."' 3 The very word "entail" seemed to connote all that was feudal and medieval in property law. The fee-tail was the stronghold of primogeniture.2 04 It was especially adapted to the needs of the landed aristocracy, for in the case of a peerage or a baronetage, the fee tail male enabled the family estate to go with the title.20 Its feudal character appeared in its exclusive application to land. A fee tail could not be created in personal, chattels or in leaseholds.
Because of its exclusive application to land, the elimination of "real property" law would have eliminated the fee tail.2 This was recognized by Sir Arthur Underhill in his epoch-making pamphlet, The Line of Least Resistance, 7 in which he proposed that all freehold land should have the legal incidents of long terms for years. Equity had followed the law in not allowing fee tails in leaseholds and the logic of his position was to eliminate the fee tail altogether. However, he recognized that possibly a majority of lawyers would be against such elimination. If the fee-tail were fo be retained as an equitable interest, the only way to accomplish this and have uniformity as to lands and chattels was to extend the fee tail to chattels, and this he proposed as an alternative.1 08 adopted. 1°0 His proposal that the only legal estate to be recognized in land should be the leasehold failed 110 but his suggestion that fee tails be extended to chattels, which was advanced to offset the objection to the elimination of the fee tail through the logic of his general proposal, survived. It is a striking example of the survival of a reactionary minor proposal suggested to make a progressive general proposal more palatable. Such pragmatic justification as the extension of the fee tail to chattels in equity has had has been that it will be simpler to make chattels accompany the land, where this is desired, by means of a fee tail than by complicated trusts."' Thus Mr. C. P. Sanger, to whom with Sir Arthur Underhill is attributed by Sir Benjamin Cherry 112 the suggestion for the change, says: "This will save much trouble when, as often happens, it is desired to settle the family pictures or heir-looms to go with the mansion house." 113 Sir Benjamin Cherry himself did not consider this, as had been suggested by some, a "retrograde step." 114 But his reasoning 11 is not convincing. As the reform legislation finally took shape, entails might have been preserved in equity without extending them to chattels. However, it is a consolation that this change in the law will probably have little practical effect, for, just as it is the custom in England to entail land, so it is not the custom to entail personalty, and custom in England is persistent. It does not seem possible that this extension of primogeniture to personalty can ever seem other than exceptional.
In other respects than its extension to chattels, the fee tail has not been favored. The words of art formerly necessary to create an entail by deed (not being an executory instrument) are now necessary even in the case of a will.,( The enrolment of disen-109 (1925) 15 Geo. V, c. 20, § 130 (1). 110 See Bordwell, Property Reform in England (1925) 
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tailing assurances is no longer necessary. 1 7 And an adult tenant in tail in possession is given power to dispose of his interest by will in like manner as if the entail had been barred at his death.' 1 9
The In the twenty-four states subsequently admitted the tendency has been for the statutes to ignore the fee-tail or to change it into a fee simple.
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That the fee tail ever had any real vitality in the United States, even in colonial times, may well be doubted. The effectiveness of the fee tail in possession had already been destroyed by the possibility of docking it at the beginning of the colonial period. It was not long afterwards that the fee tail in possession ceased to be a customary way of settling land in England." 1 With the substitution of fee tails in remainder for fee tails in possession in strict settlements, the fee tail had become rather a conveyancing device than a method of holding land, and it is not likely that this conveyancing device was used very much in the colonies. The strict settlement has been strictly English.' 2 It is manifest that entailed estates and primogeniture were in complete disaccord with colonial life and the trend of legislation.1
3
The very doubt in Massachusetts as to whether lands held in fee tail should descend to the oldest son or should be partible as lands held in fee simple 134 shows at least that it was not a common thing for entailed lands to be inherited. Of the thirteen original colonies, the fee tail survived the revolutionary era unimpaired only in Delaware, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and Rhode Island, and in these states provision was made for docking them by deed, and in Rhode Island even by will. 1 3" Practically all the current solutions for the questions raised by the Statute De Donis in the United States, therefore, date back to the Revolutionary era; (1) tail into a fee simple, 3 6 (2) the barring of the entail by a simple deed, 131 (3) the conditional fee,'13 and (4) the conversion of the interest of the first taker into a life estate or something like it with possibilities or something more substantial in the issue or children. 139 The merit of these solutions would seem to be in the order named. The fee tail was an anachronism as a method of holding land when the colonies were settled and there is no excuse for its retention in any form or guise. But if the words "heirs of the body" are to have any significance the fee tail which may be barred by the simple deed would seem to be an advance on the conditional fee. It is certainly the more favorable of the two to alienation. In laine and Massachusetts, it is true, the fee tail is still supposed to carry with it primogeniture,1 0 but probably not elsewhere. 14 L If the conditial fee carries us back prior to 1285,1 4-the fourth solution would seem to carry us still further back to the time when the struggle for the alienability of the fee was in its beginning 143 and to take the wrong side. Of all the solutions this is the least desirable. It is productive of endless litigation and not obviously calculated to carry out the intention of the donor. Where statutes are silent,'" the example of the New Hampshire court ' is to be commended in holding fee tails abolished by implication. Another change in the interest of uniformity betveen the law of real and that of personal property was the abrogation'GT of the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell,'58 whereby legal and equitable interests in land could not be limited, after a life interest to one unborn person, to the unborn child or other issue of an unborn person even though the limitation to the second generation were so guarded that it was bound to vest within the period prescribed by the rule against perpetuities, namely, a life in being and twenty-one years. The rule in Whitby v. Mitchell doubtless reflected the tradition of English conveyancers 'o and had some pretensions to ancestry in the almost mythical rule against double possibilities,"' 6 but it was difficult of application 16, and uncalled for unless the rule against perpetuities was unduly restricted.62 The rule was held inapplicable to personalty.0 3 The decision in Whitby v. Mitchell gave rise to much controversy '1 6 4 and the great authority of John Chipman Gray was thrown against it.65 Whatever the drafters of the reform legislation may have thought of the legal aspects of the controversy, they were evidently convinced that the result that Gray advocated was the more desirable and acted accordingly. ' The abolition of the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell was a part of the original reform. Once the reforming spirit was in the air, however, 'there was a tendency to take up any suggestion with regard to reform without the deliberation that would normally be expected. Thus, apparently, a correspondent's suggestion 1-1 led to the validation of gifts void for remoteness because dependant on the attainment of or failure to attain an age exceeding twenty-one years, by the substitution of that age for the age stated in the instrument. 170 This is a change that will be particularly applicable to gifts to classes and will avoid the, in many respects, unfortunate result of cases like Leake v. Robinson 171 where a gift to an entire class was destroyed because the final membership in the class could not be determined within the prescribed period. In that case Sir William Grant said 712 he would have been inclined to adapt the limitation in the way now provided for (as above) had it been within his powers as a judge to do so. The situation is a simple one of frequent occurrence where there is little question that the donor would rather have the change as to age made than have the limitation fail altogether. As an exceptional rule there is much to be said for it, but it would seem only as an exception. The general rule that a limitation is to be read in the first place as if there were no rule against perpetuities, and not to be construed or adapted so as to make it valid under the rule 173 would seem to be sound. The rule against perpetuities is generous enough 174 in general that the settlor or devisor should expect no favors in bringing his limitation within its very generous terms. The risk of the limitation being held void would seem-a very salutary check on doubtful limitations.
ABOLITION OF THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE
Prior to the case of Re Hollis' Hospital 2* in 1899, it was a much controverted point in England as to whether a common law right to enter for condition broken, and to enforce a forfeiture of the fee simple subject to the condition was subject to the rule against perpetuities. 1 7 Despite the opinion in that case that such right of entry was within the rule, there was some hesitation in accepting this as the law,17r but the matter is now settled for right of entry in general, in accordance with that case, by the Law of Property Act, 1925 .78 An exception, however, is made to conditions in regard to rent charges, and such exception is taken by Mr. Cheshire "0 to mean that all conditions attached to rent charges are outside the rule. Such is a possible construction, but the exception would seem to refer to the statutory provisions with regard to conditions attached to rent charges,E 0 and not to include such conditions when they involve a forfeiture. As conditions for forfeiture or non-payment of rent-charges are now practically obsolete,2s1 however, the matter is not important.
For many years the customary condition attached to rentcharges in England has been a condition, not to enforce a forfeiture, but to take possession by way of indemnity2E 2 Such conditions, as well as the power to levy a distress, have been considered strictly remedial 13 and therefore not within the rule. The law was so declared in the Conveyancing Act, 1911." Included within the general terms of this declaration, however, was the power to create a trust term for the purpose of collecting the rent 255 and the exclusion of this power from the rule, in the opinion of T. Cyprian Williams, 1 6 0 changed the law. These 
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provisions are now included in the Law of Property Act, 1925,"'1 with the further provision that the power to appoint a receiver for the collection of the rent is not within the rule. 1 8 The principle behind these provisions is given an independent setting and in some respects amplified in section 162 1'1 of the same act.
By section 162,190 the rule against perpetuities is also declared to be inapplicable to the grant, exception or reservation of certain easements and profits. In the absence of any comment, authoritative or otherwise, on this provision, it is a little difficult to get its exact bearing.1" As the express purpose of the provision is to clear up doubts and not to change the law, its purpose can hardly be to allow the creation of these easements and profits in the future without limitation as to time,12 but rather, it would seem, to emphasize the legality of legal or equitable easements and profits, notwithstanding the fact that they ma r not be acted upon until the indefinite future. Just as in the case of estates,' 1 0 3 it is the time of vesting and not the time of enjoyment that is material. The fact that easements are likely to hope to be permanent incumbrances does not bring present easements within the scope of the rule against perpetuities,"" and possibly section 162 (1) (d) was intended to make this 
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In South Eastern Ry. v. Associated Portland Cement Mftrs., supra note 191, at 27, Farwell, L. J., said by way of dictum that he had no doubt of the accuracy of the passage in LEwis, PERPETUITIES (1843) 619, 020, that the rule against perpetuities applied to easements in futuro. See also GRAY, op. cit. supra note 161, § 316, n. 2. It does not seem likely that the draughtsman of section 162 meant to reject these authorities or to intimate that their views had raised merely a doubt in the matter. It does seem likely that the draughtsman wfshed to approve the result in the South Eastern Ry. case, supra, and felt that he was merely amplifying Sir George Jessel's statement as to the non-application of the rule against perpetuities to easements, supra note 191. In making that statement, however, there is no indication that Sir George Jessel meant to deny the application of the rule against perpetuities to easements in futuro, nor would it seem that there was any such idea in the mind of the draughtsman of (1925) 15 clear even where the easement is one that may not be acted upon for a period beyond that of the rule."'1 No substantial change in the law as to restrictions on the accumulation of income is made by the Law of Property Act, 1925.196 The Thellusson Act 107 and the Accumulations Act, 1892,198 are reenacted. The draftsmanship of the former, however, has been greatly improved ' and the exception of provisions for raising portions for "children" has been changed by adding "or remoter issue." 201, A new section makes clear that where accumulations of surplus income are made during minority under any statutory power or under the general law, this period is not to be taken into account in determining whether an express trust for accumulations is good or bad. 20 1 Accumulations have not been troublesome enough in the United States to have occasioned much legislation, but the Thelluson Act has had some following. -An apparent result of the New York real property legislation is the anomaly that trusts to accumulate may be limited for a longer period than trusts to apply.23
EXTENSION OF THE RULE IN DEARLE V. HALL
Ever since the decision in Dearle v. Hall in 1823,2'1 it has been the rule in England that priority among assignees of hoses in action 215 or equitable interests in personalty depends, not upon the priority in time of the assignments, but upon priority of notice to the debtor or trustee. But if the rule is the child of Deaile v. Hall, it is the grandchild of Ryall v. Rowles, : and affirmed five years later by Lord Lyndhurst, C. Ibid. 55 (1828) .
The opinion by the Chancellor did little more than affirm the very able opinion of the Blaster of the Rolls. 205 When choses in action were made assignable at law by statute, the rule in Dearle v. Hall was incorporated into the statute. Jtmicr AcT, Where a valid notice cannot be served, or not without unreasonable cost or delay, a memorandum of the dealing may be endorsed on the trust instrument and shall have the same effect as notice. 215 Where there is no trust instrument the memorandum may be made on the instrument under which the equitable interest is acquired and, in particular, in case of intestacy, on the letters of administration or probate in force at the time.210
Any person interested may require production of the notice. T By section 138 it is provided that a trust corporation may be nominated by the trust instrument to whom notice shall be given instead of to the trustees.
The 22 3 that an unregistered deed was to be "fraudulent and void" against a subsequent purchaser for value, but that if the latter had taken with notice, either to himself or an agent, of the unregistered deed, the prior purchaser would be preferred in equity because this was a kind of fraud. In Morecock v. Dickis, 22 =4 Lord Camden, C., held that registration was not in itself notice. Consequently a subsequent purchaser without actual notice "was allowed to make use of the doctrine of taking, and by getting in the legal estate obtain priority over a prior equitable incumbrance notwithstanding that it was registered." 225 217 Ibid. § 137 (8). 218 The importance of this change of front is greatly enhanced by the great extension of the land charges subject to registration so as to include a great number of miscellaneous charges or obligations, notably mortgages and restrictive covenants. Every mortgage affecting a legal estate in land, whether itself legal or equitable, not being a mortgage protected by the deposit of title deeds, is to rank according to its date of registration as a land charge.
2 31 As registration is made notice, priority is to be determined as in Dearle v. Hall 232 by priority of notice. But in Dearle v. Hall it is notice to the debtor or trustee, while in the case of mortgages it is notice to the world at large by means of the registry. The priority given to mortgages protected by a deposit of title deeds over those on the registry is believed to have been due to the insistence of the bankers, 3 and is an example of what was meant by "evolution not revolution." Such priority is out of place in a registry system, as has been shown in the United States,23' and, in the opinion of Mr. Lightwood, will ultimately have to be withdrawn.2 3 5
Mortgages protected by title deeds may be either legal or equitable. Whether the one or the other, in England the first mortgage in point of time is likely to be so protected. 2 3 0
The establishment in general of the scheme of priority of mortgages by date of registration is contrary to the old doctrine of tacking mortgages, and the latter doctrine is expressly abandoned.2 37 A difficult problem in the past has been how to abandon the doctrine of tacking and yet not unduly to hamper the making of future advances. 38 Of course there is no objection to the priority of the future advances where this is agreed to by the subsequent mortgagee 2 39 or where the one making the future advance has no notice, by registration or otherwise, of the subsequent mortgage.
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In general, registration of the subsequent mortgage will be notice to the prior mortgagee under the Law of Property Act, 1925,241 but this will not be so if the prior mortgage was made expressly for securing a current account or other further advances. 242 In, such a case the subsequent mortgagee, to protect himself from subsequent advances, must notify the prior mortgagee. The prior mortgagee will also have priority as to further advances where the mortgage imposes an obligation on him to make such advances. 2 1 3 The net result of these provisions as to further advances is to bring the law in this matter in line with that in the United States. In the early stages of the reform legislation, a strong antipathy was shown to the equitable doctrine of notice. That a purchaser should be bound by an equity because he had notice of it was treated almost as a usurpation on the part of courts of equity.245 This feeling is reflected, perhaps, in the general rejection just referred to of the doctrine of Le Neve v. Lc Neve. 1 It is reflected also, perhaps, in the provision confining the local registries in Middlesex and Yorkshire to instruments affecting legal estates 247 whereas formerly equitable assurances were also subject of registration there. 2 tive notice from the registration of land charges will probably concern the priority between incumbrancers much more often than it will the one who wishes to buy the land. 249 And while the latter will be charged with the new constructive notice from the record, he will be relieved from the old constructive notice of equities in the title deeds which should have been, but were not, registered. 2 50 Notwithstanding all this and the extensive overreaching powers given to settlements and trusts for sale, 2 1 the general doctrine of notice would seem to have gained more in the last stages of the legislation by the extension of the rule in Dearle v. Hall to interests in land and the provision for the registration of mortgages than it lost by having so many equities put behind the curtain of a settlement or trust for sale. This general doctrine of notice is perhaps not the old equitable doctrine but rather the doctrine that came from bankruptcy through Dearle v. Hall. 25 2 Whatever its source, it tends to do away with the secrecy of transactions and to prevent fraud. At the same time it ought not to hinder the saleability of land.
Apart from the new 'constructive notice from the register, the doctrine of constructive notice is somewhat cut down. The definition of constructive notice in the Conveyancing Act, 1882,213 which was supposed to eliminate some of the artificialities which had developed in the matter, 254 is re-enacted. 2 55 Where an intending lessee or assign is not entitled to call for the title to the freehold or to a leasehold reversion, he is no longer deemed to be affected with notice of any matter, of which, if he had contracted that such title should be furnished, he might have had notice. This abrogates the "curious rule" 210 in Patnan v. Harland.
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249 Subsequent mortgages will now commonly be legal mortgages and will not need the doctrine of notice to protect them against purchasers. However, the constructive notice from the record should be a decided advantage as against purchasers to equitable restrictions and the like. 250 With the abrogation of the rule in Le Neve v. Le Neve, supra note 227, the purchaser will be relieved even from actual notice gained from a search of the title deeds of an equity which should have been registered. Mr. Lightwood raises the question as to whether Le N'eve v. Le Neve really has been abrogated but admits that "no one will wish his own client to be involved in it." Lightwood, 
OTHER PARTS OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY ACT, 1925
Most of what precedes has concerned Part IV, Equitable Interests and Things in Action, Part V, Leases and Tenancies, and Part VII, Perpetuities and Accumulations, of the Law of Property Act, 1925. Some consideration has been given to the provisions with regard to covenants running with the land in Part II and to the provisions with regard to notice and priorities as between mortgages in Parts XI and III respectively. A brief summary of the other parts of the Act may help to place these parts in their proper setting.
Part L entitled General Principles as to Legal Estates, Equitable Interests and Powers, contains three of the seven grouped as major reforms by Sir Leslie Scott and three of the five grouped by him as minor refolns.
.3 8 The three -major reforms are (1) the reduction of legal estates to two, the fee simple and the term for years; .-11 (2) the abolition of legal tenancies in common; 20 and (3) the keeping of most equities off the title.
2 0 2 The first two of these speak for themselves. The third is the famous "curtain scheme" for the overreaching of equities and keeping them off the title. 213 Section 60 provides, like so many'American statutes, that "a conveyance of freehold land to any person without words of limitation, or any equivalent expression, shall pass to the grantee the fee simple or other the whole interest which the grantor had power to convey .in such land, unless a contrary intention appears in the conveyance." Henceforth "month" 274 is to mean calendar month 
